

## Human Development and the Transformation of the Academy

**“Human “ is a word with many meanings, In this article I will emphasize the adjective “human” in the phrase“human development” with a view to extracting from it guidelines for the transformation of the academy.**

**Yes, “human” means “agent.” Insisting on acknowledging and enhancing human agency is enough to trigger methodological options. It favours some. It debunks others. It is enough to give meaning to transforming disciplines by humanizing them. Humanizing law. Humanizing economics. Humanizing science. Humanizing education. The academy will be transformed when all its faculties are humanized.**

**Thank you Amartya Sen. (1) Thank you Margaret Archer. (2) We needed you to rescue us from Newtonian social sciences where variables are the agents, and from post-structuralist anti-humanism.**

**But “human” means more than “agent.”**

**Humans are the animals whose ecological niche is culture. Humans are biologically programmed to be culturally programmed. (3) As Paulo Freire says, our human vocation is to be creators of culture. (4)**

**Here we reach another fork in the road, at least as important as the fork that separates the kind of so-called academic rigor that makes superficiality compulsory from the kind of realism about agency that makes the human sciences human. This second fork in the road, considered in an African context, divides the modernizing university whose function is to erase the cultures of its students from the humanizing university whose function is to affirm the cultures of its students. In a world context it divides the university stubbornly clinging to disciplines designed in Europe in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, from the university welcoming the entire world as it is now.**

**The implicit curriculum and frequently the explicit curriculum of European universities transplanted to colonial and post-colonial soil has been to modernize the natives. (5) The result of modernization in Africa has been that Africa now has the same problems the rest of the modern world has (6), such as:**

**Unemployment**

**Crime**

**Destruction of nature**

**Disenchantment**

.....

The response I am proposing, together with Professor Catherine Odora Hoppers of the University of South Africa in our forthcoming co-authored book Rethinking Thinking, can be expressed in capsule form as: humanize modernity. Humanize by enlargement. Exclude less, include more. Make the university a celebration of what humans are and have been, and will be. Bring modernity's other into the curriculum, not to assimilate modernity's other into the categories the disciplines already have, but to transform the curriculum, transform research, transform community engagement..

Among the many cultures humans have created there are many that do not know unemployment. Julius Nyerere points out that before European contact there was no unemployment in Africa. Nyerere quotes a Swahili proverb, "Host your guest for two days, and on the third day give him a hoe." (7) This proverb lives and moves and has its being in a pre-colonial world where civil law in the Roman Law tradition did not yet exist; it is a world where in Michel Foucault's terminology the historical conditions for the possibility of unemployment did not yet exist. (8)

We want to learn things many indigenous peoples know that modernity does not know,

Like how to achieve social integration and social cohesion (9)

Like how to live in a sustainable harmony with the air, the water, the earth, the plants, the animals, and all the living forms that share the planet with us. (10)

Reorganizing modernity in the light of cultural resources provided by modernity's other as Professor Hoppers conceives it is called second level indigenization. In development education as she conceives it, we are all transforming the world together; we are all learners and we are all teachers. "Human" does not refer to the *vernünftige Wesen* (rational essence) of Immanuel Kant eternally imposing the categories of Newton and of Ulpian on any possible experience. It refers to the flesh and the blood, the bodies and the

souls, the music and the voices, of all *homo sapiens* physically existing on the planet. Many of our brothers and sisters will tell us that “human” also refers to the ancestors who are called to join our parties by the singing that invites them.

The comprehensive adjective “human” also refers, of course to the Quarrelsome Twerp. You have all met him and heard what he has to say. He appears on every campus. Sometimes she appears, if the campus happens to have a Quarrelsome Twerpette. Let me briefly refresh your memory on what they say:

First they say that modernity has brought us hot and cold running water, civil rights, smallpox vaccine, the emancipation of women, increased life expectancy, the right to a fair trial when accused, flush toilets, Facebook, and Twitter.

Second they say that in traditional non-modern societies female infants are exposed to die, disease is attributed to evil spirits and treated by magic, enemies defeated in war are given a choice between gruesome death and gruesome enslavement, whole settlements and sometimes whole tribes go extinct from starvation, and the majority of the population can neither read nor write nor figure.

Professor Hoppers and I hold a twerp-proof position which can be misunderstood, but which cannot be refuted. It is transformation by enlargement. It holds that a more rational choice is one that considers more options. It holds that a more scientific science is one that as the historian of science Gaston Bachelard says leaps into abstraction by broadening its categories. (11) It includes modernity, with all its ups and downs, as one among thousands of cultures with all their ups and downs that *homo sapiens* has created as it has evolved during its four million or so years on this planet.

What is modernity? Let me briefly suggest with all due openness to carrying on anytime anywhere the long nuanced discussions the topic requires, that what we call modernity and single out as a single distinctive culture albeit an infinitely ramified one, is what Max Weber said it was. (12) Weber in turn turn can be heroically simplified by saying he said modernity is capitalism plus bureaucracy. Both capitalism and bureaucracy rely on instrumental science, Weber’s *Zweckrationalität*, and on the legal framework derived mostly from Rome that organizes exchange and defines individual juridical subjects.

In important ways all modern nation-states are successor states of the Roman Empire, starting with the states that formed when that Empire broke up, Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Portugal and so on. (13) Those were the states that later became the colonial powers ruling the rest of the world. The global world-system, as Immanuel Wallerstein has shown, is an expanded version of the European world-system of the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries. (14) Modernity is the resulting global system whose basic normative structure is Roman. Modernity's other includes all the cultures Europe conquered. It can also be stretched to include all the future cultures that have not yet been invented. In practice, as Nestor Garcia-Canclini and others have shown, today's really existing cultures are hybrids, partly modern and partly non-modern. (15)

As Immanuel Wallerstein has shown the social science disciplines as they exist today were founded in Europe in the early 1800s as part and parcel of the liberal world order that took form after the French Revolution, the rise of Napoleon's Empire, and Napoleon's defeat. (16) If today we are reframing the social sciences in the light of indigenous knowledge systems, we are not asking anything unreasonable. We are simply asking them to be in fact what they always pretended to be in theory: worldwide human sciences. We are asking them to untie the apron strings that tie them to the particular culture that gave them birth.

So our position is impeccable. It is not romantic, just rational. It is more scientific than the narrow disciplines that pass for sciences in today's untransformed academies; because it includes all the science they include plus more. It includes more because it takes a wider view of nature and of social possibilities. Its wider view of nature is a critical realism that takes as the object of natural science to be nature itself as it really is. (17) No culture, much less any scientist or group of scientists, has the privilege of authoritatively declaring what nature really is. It is more realistic, not less realistic, to acknowledge that different peoples conceive reality differently.

Let me say two things more before closing. Let me venture forth from the safety of impeccable claims that are true by definition. Let me say two things that might be false. First, indigenous knowledge systems lead us back to metaphysics. Second, IKS can lead us toward solutions of the intractable problems of modernity.

Metaphysics. One would have thought that after Bertrand Russell and the logical positivists thoroughly destroyed metaphysics in the first half of the

twentieth century, there would be no metaphysics left to destroy in any department of any respectable university. (18) But no. In the second half of the twentieth century Jacques Derrida and the deconstructionists destroyed all over again what the positivists had already expunged from the books of knowledge. (19) But now indigenous knowledge systems are leading us back to metaphysics.

The path back to metaphysics begins when “knowledge” in the contexts of most human cultures turns out not to be the same as the factual knowledge that modern western universities mainly produce and disseminate, or at least pretend to produce and disseminate. IKS is embedded in worldview, in social structure, in personal relationships, in spirituality, in respect for plants and animals and all beings, in art and music, in religion, in cosmology, in way of life. (20)

Then we realize that an indigenous knowledge system is part and parcel of a cultural cosmology. In a moment I will explain why we can say it is part and parcel of a metaphysics.

A cultural cosmology, or IKS, organizes several things at once. It organizes livelihoods. It organizes social cohesion, keeping violent conflict down to a tolerable level. It meets the deep emotional needs of bodies that have evolved for four million years under the stars, close to plants and animals; close to the soil and the waters, close to sisters and the brothers, under the moon, under the sun. It is magic. One thing we learn from the comparative study of cultures is that magicians have played a greater role in most cultures than they do in modernity. (21) But magic refuses to disappear into the dustbin of history. God and Harry Potter are my witnesses: magic is still fun. People like it. Please allow me now to use a slightly technical terminology. A cosmology that organizes the interchange of human labour with the environment, a cosmology that meets the basic needs for food and security, a cosmology that keeps everybody singing and dancing, a cosmology that organizes a sustainable and harmonious relationship with nature; and that gives divine meaning to birth, to rites of passage, and to death; that kind of multifaceted and multifunctional cosmology is technically defined as a “cool cosmology

These cosmologies that organize cultures and lead us back to metaphysics, also lead us back to where this artocñe began: to humanization and to the idea of what it means to be human.

From the very beginning of the process of human development in the academy, from the moment that we start using ideas like *ubuntu*, from the moment we say “I am because you are,” from the moment we start talking about humanizing, we are already re-enchanting a disenchanted world with a cool cosmology. (22) The very idea of a human being is a magical idea. The very idea of “human” is a divine idea.

Let me give some examples. In the Setswana language and in several related languages to talk about respect for a human being, or the dignity of a human being one uses the word *seriti*. *Seriti* means “shadow.” If one goes back now to the Bible and to Greek philosophy, to the ancient days of western culture before modernity set in, one finds that respect is expressed by thinking of the human as a soul. The Greek word is *psuche*, which in Greek also means “butterfly.” The related word translated as “spirit” is *pneuma* in Greek, *ruach* in Hebrew. *Ruach* and *pneuma* mean “breath” or “wind.” The Hindus have their famous *namaste* gesture when humans salute each other by joining the palms and bowing to the divine essence within. What do these examples tell us? They tell us that when we are treating a human being as a human being, what we respect is not precisely the physical body. It is something magical associated with that body, something that blurs the boundary between the material and immaterial: a shadow, a butterfly, a breath, a wind, a God within; or, to use still other examples from still other cultures, one respects a totemic identification with a bird, a leopard, a cloud; one respects the living representative of a myth of origin, or of the ancestors of a clan.

If we now turn around to look at modern western culture again, we will find that its knowledge industry is not separate from the rest of its culture either. Its institutional assumptions are imbedded in a cultural cosmology. What is true of indigenous knowledge systems is true of the modern West, and of its world-conquering extension the global economy.

In the civil laws stemming from the Roman tradition, respect for human beings is defined as respect for “persons.” *Persona* is a latin word that means “mask.” Respect for persons as the juridical subjects who own property and exchange commodities in markets is an idea that began in heaven and later descended to earth. The latin word for “mask” was first used by theologians to explain the holy trinity, God in three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. God in three masks. (23) Later the jurists employed that theological term to define the human being worthy of respect. The person. With the protestant

reformation, with democratic ideals, and with modern civil codes came the principle of equal respect for all persons. (24)

Humanizing the academy, humanizing law, humanizing economics, humanizing science, humanizing education, is therefore already re-enchantment. It is already divine magic.

And then we will be led back to the ancient idea Aristotle expressed in his “first philosophy.” Aristotle’s idea founded traditions called “metaphysics” in the Islamic, Judaic, and Christian worlds. It is the idea that there are basic categories that tend to run through everything people think and do. I have said a bit about categories naming subjects, but there are also categories naming objects, times, places, and so on. Nowadays we can say not only that such categories exist, but that there are different sets of such categories in different cultures. Cultures have patterns. I have been using the world cosmology to refer to organizing patterns than run through whatever the members of a culture think, say, or do. We can also use the word “metaphysics” to refer to a culture’s categories of thought.

Now that we have recovered a vocabulary that includes the word “metaphysics,” we can say something we could not say before: Metaphysical differences make it both difficult and rewarding to engage in intercultural dialogue. The other, the one whose culture is different from ours, not only has different opinions, different interests, different values, a different vocabulary. The other may have a whole different way of organizing experience; a different cosmology, different categories. Thinking of intercultural dialogue as the encounter of one metaphysics with another metaphysics makes the dialogue in the beginning more respectful and in the end more authentic.

Am I being clear? Metaphysics typically frames knowledge and magic simultaneously. The number one item in the magic category is the soul, the person, the human being.

At this point I am engaged in a love-hate relationship with what is called post-modernism or post-structuralism. I refer to Friedrich Nietzsche, a 19<sup>th</sup> century thinker ahead of his time who anticipated and inspired post-modern ideas, to Michel Foucault and his friend Gilles Deleuze, to Jacques Derrida, and to their many followers.

It is a love relationship because they have deconstructed the Enlightenment. When Africa, Asia, and Latin America were conquered and colonized, when their traditional institutions were to a large extent destroyed and replaced by property rights and commercial exchange organized by Roman Law principles, Europeans were able to appeal to the ideals of the Enlightenment to rationalize what they could call a civilizing mission. Europe had civilization. Africa only had culture. Europe had a rational legal system. Africa only had customs. Europe had science. Africa had superstition. Europe had universal human rights. Africans had local traditions.

Now the leading lights of European thought have deconstructed the Enlightenment. It is no longer possible to say that the modern culture Europe imposed by force on the rest of the world is authorized by universal and eternal rational principles. It is one set of socially constructed institutions among the many sets of socially constructed institutions humans have created, and will continue to create unless we destroy our species by high tech warfare or by destroying our habitat the biosphere. For this we have the post-modernists to thank. They have levelled the playing field.

The hate part is about their anti-humanism. In deconstructing metaphysics they have sought to deconstruct in particular one central metaphysical concept: man, the human being, humanity. Michel Foucault, for example, in his book The Order of Things attacks the idea of "man" (*l'homme*). (25) Humanity was according to Foucault a bogus idea invented by Immanuel Kant and other early modern philosophers to supply a bogus moral authority to replace the declining moral authority of the church and the declining moral authority of kings and queens. Foucault echoes Nietzsche's concept that the death of God implies the death of man. If there is no divine authority, then there can only be sham and perverse reasons for regarding human beings as somehow divine and therefore worthy of sacred respect.

Here we do not agree. Our response is intellectual, strategic, and pragmatic. Intellectually, it is a fact about the human species that we are active agents who create cultures. Notable among our cultural inventions are ideas that make a physical human body a social object worthy of sacred respect, including among others *seriti*, *ubuntu*, *psuche*, *pneuma*, *ruach*, soul, spirit, person, and human rights. Strategically, human development is a promising path toward transforming the academy. Pragmatically, magic works. Don't knock it.



**Second and last, the intractable problems.**

**It appears to be impossible to change the system. When I say just these nine words, "It appears to be impossible to change the system," I find that most people have an immediate sense that they understand what I have in mind.**

**I have in mind that the intractable problems, among them unemployment, crime, destruction of the biosphere, and disenchantment are part and parcel of the modern world-system. If the system cannot be changed, then they cannot be solved. Apparently the system cannot be changed. Therefore apparently they cannot be solved.**

**In several books that have been featured on the New York Times Worst Seller List, I make this point crystal clear at great length. (26) I do not know how to make myself clear briefly, but I will now give it a shot by approaching the topic briefly from six different angles.**

**Angle One. The school of thought known as educational pessimism. Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron have argued that education necessarily reproduces the basic structure of society as it is. Education cannot possibly change the system. (27)**

**Angle Two. The abandonment of the Freedom Charter by the ANC. Nelson Mandela said in 1992, "Chaps we have to choose. We either keep nationalization and get no investment, or we modify our own attitude and get investment." (28)**

**Angle Three: Jeffrey Winters' excellent book, Power in Motion: capital mobility and the Indonesian state. Using data from Indonesia and other places, Winters describes what he calls a Locational Revolution that is still in its early stages and whose full consequences are yet to be felt. Others have called it a race to the bottom. As employers move from one location to another in search of better labour at lower costs, employees and their children can expect for the foreseeable future lower wages, fewer benefits, and more precarious employment. There appears to be no way to avoid this result. (29)**

**Angle Four: The regulationist school of economists centred at the University of Grenoble expresses a thought that goes back at least to Adam Smith: Whatever else governments do, they must guarantee the conditions that make the accumulation of profits possible. Profits are the mainspring that starts production. Therefore it is imperative to do whatever must be done to keep them flowing. I am not saying this quite correctly. The Grenoble concept of**

**“regime of accumulation” refers not just to politics and governments, but also to every dimension of culture. Everything must be compatible with the one thing needful, namely accumulation of profits. (30) The system cannot be changed because system change tends to undermine accumulation. When it is challenged, the regime of accumulation fights back with weapons like capital flight, unemployment, inflation... The penalty for not surrendering to reality as Nelson Mandela did in 1992 is chaos.**

**Angle Five: John Maynard Keynes says approximately the same thing in the eloquent Chapter Twelve of his General Theory. Keynes uses the term “confidence.” It follows from the overriding need for confidence that the system does not change. Efforts to change it frequently tend to undermine confidence. The need for confidence wins. Change loses.**

**Angle Six: In Chile in the early 1970s we had a government that sought social justice by strengthening labour unions, reducing inequalities, raising wages, and increasing the size of the public sector. The economy collapsed. After a coup d'état, a military government broke unions, increased inequality, lowered wages, and privatized the public sector. (31) The economy recovered. Chile is not the only example that could be cited.**

**Perhaps the glimpses available from these six angles will make it easier to see a reason why in spite of a knowledge explosion that has produced more books and scholarly studies on any given human problem than anybody has time to read, humanity's principal problems remain intractable. We are in the presence of what Thomas Kuhn calls an anomaly. There are more universities than ever before, more PhDs, more students, more research, more data, more publications, but at the same time there is more unemployment, more crime, more environmental destruction, more disenchantment, and so on. In Kuhn's terminology we need to change paradigms. Normal science does not resolve the anomaly. Perhaps we can change paradigms, and perhaps IKS can help us to do so.**

**The intractable problems may be inherent in the institutional assumptions of the scholars who are studying how to solve them. They may be inherent in their epistemologies and in their methodologies.**

Perhaps, after all, the system can be changed, because, perhaps, modern institutions can be reconsidered and revised. Indigenous knowledge systems might perhaps show us the way.

Humanizing the university, we are claiming, leads to reframing knowledge production in ways that focus on modernity as Amartya Sen advocates focussing on markets. (32) A transformed academy would treat modern institutions as one path among others, and not always the best path. Modern culture is available to be chosen and followed (or partially chosen and partially followed) for the purpose of enhancing human capacities. The end governs the choice of means. It is the commitment to the service of humanity that should define the university, not a preconceived idea of what knowledge is supposed to be.

In closing, I would like to suggest two theses for further discussion:

**Thesis One:** The intractable problems of modernity cannot be solved within the paradigms of modernity.

**Thesis Two:** A humanized academy, transformed by the integration of indigenous knowledge systems and the consequent resignifying of modern institutions, can contribute to solving modernity's intractable problems.

I mean to suggest for discussion not only whether these two theses can be sustained as true, but also how they might be interpreted, qualified, and suitably amended.

### References

- (1) Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999.
- (2) Margaret Archer, Being Human: the Problem of Agency. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- (3) See for example the review of findings regarding human origins by Nancy Tanner. She shows that the human body evolved to be the body of a cultural animal. Capacities for cooperation and other features of culture gave our ancestors a competitive edge from our

- species' earliest beginnings. Nancy Tanner, On Becoming Human. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- (4) Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Continuum Books, 1993. At the very beginning of the book Freire identifies "humanization" as the key problem of our times.
  - (5) See for example, Thomas Jesse Jones, "The White Man's Burden in Africa," Current History, volume 23, pp. 213-21 (November 1925); L. Gray Cowan, "British and French Education in Africa: a critical appraisal," in Don Piper and Taylor Cole (eds.), Post Primary Education and Political and Economic Development. Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1964; Otonti Nduka, Education and the Nigerian Cultural Background. Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1964.
  - (6) There is an immense literature, starting with the founding classics of sociology by Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and Karl Marx which shows or tends to show that the chronic problems of modernity are inherent in its basic structures. Here I cite only Walter Rodney's work contrasting Africa before and after European contact Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972. and one of my own works which argues that modernity's chronic problems cannot be solved within its basic legal and normative structure. Howard Richards and Joanna Swanger, The Dilemmas of Social Democracies. Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2006.
  - (7) Julius Nyerere, "Ujamaa, the Basis of African Socialism," speech given in April of 1962 included in his Freedom and Socialism. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968.
  - (8) Immanuel Kant invented the idea that there are conditions of any possible experience in his Critique of Pure Reason. (first published in German as *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* in 1781). Michel Foucault in several of his works gives this kantian idea the twist that the conditions of a possible experience are historical. In his doctoral dissertation, published as Histoire de la folie a l'age classique (Paris, Gallimard, 1961) (Madness and Civilization. New York: Vintage, 1965) he argued that insanity as we experience it was not a possible experience in 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century Europe.

- (9) See generally the works of Marcel Mauss, who reviewed the studies available at the time he wrote, for example Marcel Mauss, *La cohesion sociale dans les sociétés polysegmentaires*. Paris: Bulletin de l'Institut Français de Sociologie, 1931. For more recent appreciations of the social achievements of indigenous peoples see the works of Marshall Sahlins.
- (10) See for example Wisdom Keepers: Meetings with Native American Spiritual Elders. Hillsboro OR: Beyond Words Publishing, 1997.
- (11) Gaston Bachelard, *La formation de l'esprit scientifique*. Paris : Vrin 1947 and other works by the same author.
- (12) In *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist der Kapitalismus* (1920) Weber attributes the modern capitalist spirit to an asceticism moved to accumulate capital rather than to spend. However it becomes clear in his larger work *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (1922) that modernity is about rationalization in general, including that of governmental bureaucracies, and that what makes it possible is a stable legal framework permitting the making of economic calculations.
- (13) The importance of the Roman-type legal framework of the modern world for understandings its chronic problems is brought out in our previously cited Dilemmas of Social Democracies. (2006) For a classic (1904) study of its crucial significance see Karl Renner, The Institutions of Private Law and their Social Functions. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949 (reprint).
- (14) Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System. New York: Academic Press, three volumes 1974, 1980, 1989.
- (15) Nestor Garcia Canclini, Hybrid Cultures: strategies for entering and leaving modernity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.
- (16) Immanuel Wallerstein, Unthinking Social Science. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.
- (17) Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science. Leeds: Leeds Books, 1975, and other works by the same author.

- (18) Hans Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951.
- (19) John Sallis, Delimitations: Phenomenology and the End of Metaphysics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986.
- (20) That IKS is embedded in wider cultural cosmologies that organize social life is not so much proven as taken for granted in for example D. Michael Warren et al, The Cultural Dimension of Development: Indigenous Knowledge Systems. London: IT Press, 1995; Helen Verran, Science and an African Logic. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001; Kwasi Wideru, Cultural Universals and Particulars: an African Perspective. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996; Anthony K. Appiah, In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Social scientists who in other respects differ greatly from one another find that practical knowledge is integrated into worldviews that also organize society. Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture. New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1934; Marvin Harris, Cows Pigs Wars and Witches. London: Hutchinson, 1975; Bronislaw Malinowski, Myth in Primitive Psychology. New York: WW Norton, 1926. Although it may be less obvious to some, science and social structure are also inextricably embedded in each other in Europe; for a good example see Gideon Freudenthal, *Atom und Individuum in Zeitalters Newton*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2010.
- (21) Marcel Mauss et H. Hubert, "Esquisse d'une theorie generale de la magie, » Paris : Annee Sociologique. 1902-03. Available online at <http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/mauss>.
- (22) The idea that the modern world is inherently "disenchanted" translates Max Weber's *Entzauberung*, which more literally translated means "the magic has been taken away." Marshall Berman has enthusiastically advocated "re-enchantment" but unfortunately in doing so has fallen into more nonsense than we care to share. The Reenchantment of the World. New York: Bantam, 1984.
- (23) Joseph W. Koterski, "Boethius and the Theological Origins of the Concept of Person," The American Catholic Philosophical

- Quarterly. Volume 78 (2004) pp. 203-224. Hans Urs von Balthasar, “On the Concept of Person,” Comunio: International Catholic Quarterly. Volume 13 (1986) pp. 19-26.
- (24) Michael Carrithers et al. (eds.) The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- (25) Michel Foucault, The Order of Things. New York: Pantheon, 1970. French original: *Les mots et les choses.* Paris: Gallimard, 1966. The attack on humanism is at the very end of the book.
- (26) Howard Richards, Letters from Quebec. San Francisco and London: International Scholars Press, 1995. Howard Richards, Understanding the Global Economy. Delhi: Maadhyam Books, 2000. Howard Richards and Joanna Swanger, Dilemmas of Social Democracies. Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2006. Catherine Hoppers and Howard Richards, Rethinking Thinking: Modernity’s Other and the Transformation of the University. Pretoria: University of South Africa Press, forthcoming.
- (27) Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, Reproduction in Education, Culture, and Society. London : Sage Publications, 1977.
- (28) Nelson Mandela, quoted in Anthony Sampson, Mandela, the Authorized Biography. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999. P. 429. See also “Power and Principle in South Africa,” which is Chapter Ten of Dilemmas of Social Democracies.
- (29) Jeffrey Winters, Power in Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesian State. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.
- (30) Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: the U.S. Experience. London: New Left Books, 1980; Michel Aglietta, “Capitalism at the Turn of the Century: Regulation Theory and the Challenge of Social Change,” New Left Review. Volume 232 (1998) pages 41-90; Robert Boyer, “Is a Finance Led Growth Regime a Viable Alternative to Fordism?” Economy and Society. Volume 29 (2000), pages 111-145.

- (31) Stefan de Vyder, Allende's Chile: The Political Economy of the Rise and Fall of the Unidad Popular. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
- (32) For Sen the market is, "...among the instruments that can help to promote human capabilities." Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze, India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity. page 202.