In this issue we feature 6 current papers on the theme of social capital:

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In this issue we have:

1. Third-Party vs. Second-Party Control: Disentangling the role of autonomy and reciprocity - Gabriel Burdin; Simon Halliday; Fabio Landini
2. Carbon Emissions and Social Capital in Sweden - George Marbuah; Ing-Marie Gren
3. What if women earned more than their spouse? An experimental investigation of work division in couples - François Cochard; Hélène Couprie; Astrid Hopfensitz
4. Authority and centrality: Power and cooperation in social dilemma networks - Boris van Leeuwen; Abhijit Ramalingam; David Rojo Arjona; Arthur Schram
5. Why are heterogeneous communities inefficient? Theory, history, and an experiment - David Hugh-Jones; Carlo Perroni
6. Identity and group conflict - Subhasish M. Chowdhury; Joo Young Jeon; Abhijit Ramalingam

1. Third-Party vs. Second-Party Control: Disentangling the role of autonomy and reciprocity.

   Gabriel Burdin (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias

    Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía)

   Simon Halliday (Smith College (United States). Department of Economics)

   Fabio Landini (Bocconi University (Italy). Department of Political Science)  This paper studies the role of autonomy and reciprocity in explaining control  averse responses in principal-agents interactions. While most of the social  psychology literature emphasizes the role of autonomy, recent economic  research has provided an alternative explanation based on reciprocity. We  propose a simple model and an experiment to test the relative strength of  these two motives. We compare two treatments: one in which control is exerted  directly by the principal (second-party control); and the other in which it  is exerted by a third party enjoying no residual claimancy rights  (third-party control). If control aversion is driven mainly by autonomy, then  it should persist in the third-party treatment. Our results, however, suggest  that this is not the case. Moreover, when a third party instead of the  principal exerts control, control results in a greater expected profit for  the principal. The implications of these results for organizational design  are discussed.

   Keywords: third-party, second-party, control aversion, autonomy,

    principal-agent game, social preferences, trust, reciprocity

   JEL: C72 C91 D23 M54

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulr:wpaper:dt-12-15&r=soc

2. Carbon Emissions and Social Capital in Sweden

   George Marbuah (Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural

    Sciences)

   Ing-Marie Gren (Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural

    Sciences)

 This paper addresses the issue of whether or not social capital explains per  capita CO2 emissions dynamics in Swedish counties in an augmented  environmental Kuznets curve framework. By accounting for issues of  endogeneity in the presence of dynamic and spatial effects using  geo-referenced emissions data, we show that per capita carbon emissions in a  county matters for other counties and that net of economic, demographic and  environmental factors, social capital has the potential to reduce carbon  emissions in Sweden albeit less robustly. We test two different social  capital constructs; trust in government and environmental engagement.

 Specifically, trust in the government inures to the reduction in CO2  emissions. Membership and engagement in environmental organisations reduces

 CO2 emissions only through its interaction with per capita income or trust.

 The implication of our estimates suggest that investment geared toward  increasing the stock of social capital could inure to re ductions in CO2  emissions in addition to climate policy instruments in Sweden.

   Keywords: Environmental Kuznets curve, Social capital, CO2 emissions,

    Spatial panel analysis, Sweden

   JEL: C23 Q53 Q56 Z13

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fae:wpaper:2015.14&r=soc

3. What if women earned more than their spouse? An experimental investigation of work division in couples

   François Cochard (CRESE EA3190, Univ. Bourgogne Franche-Comté)

   Hélène Couprie (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA)

   Astrid Hopfensitz (Toulouse School of Economics)  Female specialization on household work and male specialization on  labor-market work is a widely observed phenomenon across time and countries.

 Gender differences regarding characteristics (preferences, productivity) and  context (wage rates, social norms) are generally recognized to explain this  fact. We experimentally investigate work division by true co-habiting couples  participating in a newly developed specialization task. Efficiency in this  task comes at the cost of inequality, giving higher earnings to the  “advantaged” player. We compare behavior when men (or women) are in the  advantaged position, which correspond to the traditional (or power) couple  case where he (or she) earns more. We show that women do not contribute more  than men to the household public good whatever the situation. This result  allows us to rule-out some of the standard explanations of the work division  puzzle.

   Keywords: Experiment on couples, Time allocation, Work division

   JEL: D13 C99 J16

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crb:wpaper:2015-08&r=soc

4. Authority and centrality: Power and cooperation in social dilemma networks

   Boris van Leeuwen (Toulouse School of Economics)

   Abhijit Ramalingam (University of East Anglia)

   David Rojo Arjona (University of Leicester)

   Arthur Schram (Amsterdam School of Economics)  We investigate the effects of power on cooperation in repeated social dilemma  settings. Groups of five players play either multi-player trust games or  VCM-games on a fixed network. Power stems from having the authority to  allocate funds raised through voluntary contributions by all members and/or  from having a pivotal position in the network (centrality). We compare  environments with and without ostracism by allowing players in some  treatments to exclude others from further participation in the network. Our  results show that power matters but that its effects hinge strongly on the  type involved. Reminiscent of the literature on leadership, players with  authority often act more cooperatively than those without such power.

 Nevertheless, when possible, they are quickly ostracized from the group.

 Thus, this kind of power is not tolerated by the powerless. In stark  contrast, centrality leads to less cooperative behavior and this free riding  is not punished; conditional on cooperativeness, players with power from  centrality are less likely to be ostracized than those without. Hence, not  only is this type of power tolerated, but so is the free riding it leads to.

   Keywords: power, cooperation, networks, public goods

   JEL: C91 D02 D03 H41

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:wcbess:15-04&r=soc

5. Why are heterogeneous communities inefficient? Theory, history, and an experiment

   David Hugh-Jones (University of East Anglia)

   Carlo Perroni (University of Warwick)  We examine why heterogenous communities may fail to provide public goods.

 Current work characterizes sanctioning free-riders as an under-supplied  public good. We argue that often free-riders can be punished by the  coordinated action of a group. This punishment can be profitable, and need  not be undersupplied. But the power to expropriate defectors can also be used  to expropriate outgroups. Heterogenous societies may be inefficient because  minorities, rather than free-riders, are expropriated. Even if this is not  so, groups’ different beliefs about the reasons for expropriation may make  the threat of punishment less effective at preventing free-riding. We  illustrate our theory with evidence from California mining camps,  contemporary India, and US schools. In a public goods experiment using  minimal groups and a profitable punishment institution, outgroups were more  likely to be punished, and reacted differently to punishment than in group  members.

   Keywords: group coercion, social heterogeneity

   JEL: H1 H4 N4 D02

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:wcbess:15-08&r=soc

6. Identity and group conflict Subhasish M. Chowdhury (University of East Anglia)

   Joo Young Jeon (University of East Anglia)

   Abhijit Ramalingam (University of East Anglia)  We experimentally investigate the effects of real and minimal identities on  group conflict. In turn we provide a direct test of the hypotheses coined by  Amartya Sen that the salience of a real identity escalates conflict but that  of a mere classification would not do so. In a baseline treatment two groups  – one of East Asians, and the other of Caucasians – engage in a group  contest, but the information on racial composition is not revealed. In the  minimal identity treatment each group is arbitrarily given a different color  code, whereas in the real identity treatment the race information is  revealed. Supporting Sen’s hypotheses, we find that compared to the  baseline, free-riding declines and conflict effort increases in the real  identity treatment but not in the minimal identity treatment. Moreover, this  occurs due to an increase in efforts in the real identity treatment by  females in both racial groups, but not by a particular racial group.

   Keywords: conflict, identity, race, gender

   JEL: C91 C92 D03 D74 J15 J16

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:wcbess:15-09&r=soc

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