In this issue we feature 11 current papers on the theme of social capital:

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1. Women form social networks more selectively and less opportunistically than men - Friebel, Guido; Lalanne, Marie; Richter, Bernard; Schwardmann, Peter; Seabright, Paul
2. Gender differences in honesty: The role of social value orientation - Grosch, Kerstin; Rau, Holger
3. Gender and Peer Effects in Social Networks - Julie Beugnot; Bernard Fortin; Guy Lacroix; Marie-Claire Villeval
4. Friends or Strangers? Strategic Uncertainty and Cooperation across Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes - Gabriele Chierchia; Fabio Tufano; Giorgio Coricelli
5. Do I care if you are paid? A field experiment on charitable donations - Gneezy, Uri; Rau, Holger; Samek, Anya; Zhurakhovska, Lilia
6. Are the Rich More Selfish than the Poor, or Do They Just Have More Money? A Natural Field Experiment - James Andreoni; Nikos Nikiforakis; Jan Stoop
7. Building trust by qualification in a market for expert services - Schneider, Tim; Bizer, Kilian
8. Enforce Tax Compliance, but Cautiously: The Role of Trust in Authorities and Power of Authorities - Tsikas, Stefanos A.
9. Choice of the Group Increases Intra-Cooperation - Babkina, Tatiana; Myagkov, Mikhail; Lukinova, Evgeniya; Peshkovskaya, Anastasiya; Menshikova, Olga; Berkman, Elliot T.
10. Can Television Reduce Xenophobia? The Case of East Germany - Lars Hornuf; Marc Oliver Rieger
11. Discrimination as favoritism: The private benefits and social costs of in-group favoritism in an experimental labor market - David L. Dickinson; David Masclet; Emmanuel Perterle

 1. Women form social networks more selectively and less opportunistically than men

    Friebel, Guido

    Lalanne, Marie

    Richter, Bernard

    Schwardmann, Peter

    Seabright, Paul

 We test two hypotheses, based on sexual selection theory, about gender  differences in costly social interactions. Differential selectivity states  that women invest less than men in interactions with new individuals.

 Differential opportunism states that women's investment in social  interactions is less responsive to information about the interaction's  payoffs. The hypotheses imply that women's social networks are more stable  and path dependent and composed of a greater proportion of strong relative to  weak links. During their introductory week, we let new university students  play an experimental trust game, first with one anonymous partner, then with  the same and a new partner. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that  women invest less than men in new partners and that their investments are  only half as responsive to information about the likely returns to the  investment. Moreover, subsequent formation of students' real social networks  is consistent with the experimental results: being randomly assigned to the  same introductory group has a much larger positive effect on women's  likelihood of reporting a subsequent friendship.

    Keywords: social networks,gender differences,trust game

    JEL: C91 D81 J16

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:safewp:168&r=soc

 2. Gender differences in honesty: The role of social value orientation

    Grosch, Kerstin

    Rau, Holger

 This paper experimentally analyzes the determinants of the honesty norm in a  lying game. The findings confirm common gender differences, i.e., men cheat  significantly more than women. We detect a novel correlation between  subjects' magnitude of concern they have for others (social value

 orientation) and their moral valuation of the norm honesty. The data suggest  that individualistic subjects are less honest than prosocial ones.

 Interestingly, this difference can explain the gender differences we observe.

 First, we find that the distribution of social value orientation differs  between gender, i.e., significantly more male subjects are characterized as  individualistic subjects. Second, once we control for social value  orientation the gender differential disappears.

    Keywords: experiment,gender differences,honesty,social value orientation

    JEL: C91 H26 J16

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cegedp:308&r=soc

 3. Gender and Peer Effects in Social Networks

    Julie Beugnot (UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté, CRESE - Centre

     de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de

     Franche-Comté)

    Bernard Fortin (CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse

     des organisations - UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal)

    Guy Lacroix (CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse

     des organisations - UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal)

    Marie-Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de

     théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 -

     Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 -

     UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Etienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS -

     Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)  We investigate whether peer effects at work differ by gender and whether the  gender difference in peer effects –if any- depends on work organization,  precisely the structure of social networks. We develop a social network model  with gender heterogeneity that we test by means of a realeffort laboratory  experiment. We compare sequential networks in which information on peers  flows exclusively downward (from peers to the worker) and simultaneous  networks where it disseminates bi-directionally along an undirected line  (from peers to the worker and from the worker to peers). We identify strong  gender differences in peer effects, as males’ effort increases with peers’

 performance in both types of network, whereas females behave conditionally.

 While they are influenced by peers in sequential networks, females disregard  their peers’ performance when information flows in both directions. We reject  that the difference between networks is driven by having one’s performance  observed by others or by the presence of peers in the same session in  simultaneous networks. We interpret the gender difference in terms of  perception of a higher competitiveness of the environment in simultaneous  than in sequential networks because of the bi-directional flow of information.

    Keywords: Gender, peer effects, social networks, work effort, experiment

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01481999&r=soc

 4. Friends or Strangers? Strategic Uncertainty and Cooperation across Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes

    Gabriele Chierchia (Center for Mind/Brain Science, University of Trento;

     and Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Berlin)

    Fabio Tufano (School of Economics, University of Nottingham)

    Giorgio Coricelli (Center for Mind/Brain Science, University of Trento;

     and Department of Economics, University of Southern California)  It is commonly assumed that friendship should decrease strategic uncertainty  in games involving tacit coordination. However, this has never been tested on  two “opposite poles†of coordination, namely, games of strategic  complements and substitutes. We present an experimental study having  participants interacting with either a friend or a stranger in two classic

 games: (i.) the stag hunt game, which exhibits strategic complementarity;

 (ii.) the entry game, which exhibits strategic substitutability. Both games  capture a frequent trade-off between a potentially high paying but uncertain  action and a lower paying but safe alternative. We find that, relative to  strangers, friends exhibit a propensity towards uncertainty in the stag hunt  game, but an aversion to uncertainty in the entry game. Friends also  “trembled†less than strangers in the stag hunt game but this advantage  was lost in the entry game. We further investigate the role of interpersonal  similarities and friendship qualities on friendship’s differential impact  on uncertainty across games of strategic complements and substitutes.

    Keywords: coordination; entry game; friendship; strategic complementarity; strategic substitutability; stag hunt game; strategic uncertainty

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2017-03&r=soc

 5. Do I care if you are paid? A field experiment on charitable donations

    Gneezy, Uri

    Rau, Holger

    Samek, Anya

    Zhurakhovska, Lilia

 This study investigates how information on solicitors' compensation affects  charitable giving in a door-to-door field experiment with more than 2,800  households. We vary whether solicitors are paid or not and the information  about this compensation that potential donors receive. Relative to the  treatment in which potential donors are not informed about the solicitor's  compensation, donations increase by 16% when potential donors are informed  that solicitors are paid, but are not effected when donors are informed that  solicitors are unpaid. The effect is driven by female donors, who increase  their donations by 88%. Our findings suggest that if charities pay their  solicitors, it could be beneficial to communicate this information to donors.

    Keywords: charitable giving,field experiment,information

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cegedp:307&r=soc

 6. Are the Rich More Selfish than the Poor, or Do They Just Have More Money? A Natural Field Experiment

    James Andreoni

    Nikos Nikiforakis

    Jan Stoop

 The growing concentration of resources among the rich has re-ignited a  discussion about whether the rich are more selfish than others. While many  recent studies show the rich behaving less pro-socially, endogeneity and  selection problems prevent safe inferences about differences in social  preferences. We present new evidence from a natural field experiment in which  we “misdeliver” envelopes to rich and poor households in a Dutch city,  varying their contents to identify motives for returning them. Our raw data  indicate the rich behave more pro-socially. Controlling for pressures  associated with poverty and the marginal utility of money, however, we find  no difference in social preferences. The primary distinction between rich and  poor is simply that the rich have more money.

    JEL: C93 D63 D64

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23229&r=soc

 7. Building trust by qualification in a market for expert services

    Schneider, Tim

    Bizer, Kilian

 Markets for credence goods are classified by experts alone being able to  identify consumers' problems and determine appropriate services for solution.

 Examining a market where experts have to invest in costly diagnosis to  correctly identify problems and consumers being able to visit multiple  experts for diagnosis, we introduce heterogeneously qualified experts. We  assume that high skilled experts can identify problems with some probability  even with low effort, e.g. due to education or experience. In a laboratory  experiment we show that, against our theoretical predictions, this does not  lead to a drop in experts' willingness for high diagnostic effort. However,  consumers generally distrust experts' diagnosis effort as they buy less often  after their first recommendation than it would be optimal and show frequently  other non-optimal behavior patterns, e.g. receiving recommendations but do  not buy service. Our results indicate that, at some level, introducing higher  qualified experts increases the quality of diagnosis, as well as consumers'

 trust resulting in more and quicker service purchases.

    Keywords: credence goods,expert market,second opinions,diagnostic effort,qualification,laboratory experiment

    JEL: C70 C91 D40

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cegedp:309&r=soc

 8. Enforce Tax Compliance, but Cautiously: The Role of Trust in Authorities and Power of Authorities

    Tsikas, Stefanos A.

 The "Slippery Slope Framework" hypothesizes that (an individual's) tax  compliance is determined by both the tax authority's powerfulness and its  trustworthiness, and that the two dimensions moderate each other. By  employing a within-country fixed effects analysis for 25 European countries,  this paper tests the conjecture that a slippery slope exists also on the  aggregate level. Results show that both trust and power are positively  correlated with higher tax compliance. Trust and power also moderate each

 other: the lower trust, the greater the compliance-increasing impact of  power. However, the positive effect decreases with increasing coercion.

 Strong deterrence policies may eventually damage tax compliance.

    Keywords: Tax compliance; Slippery Slope Framework; trust; power;

     institutions

    JEL: E62 H26 H30

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-589&r=soc

 9. Choice of the Group Increases Intra-Cooperation

    Babkina, Tatiana

    Myagkov, Mikhail

    Lukinova, Evgeniya

    Peshkovskaya, Anastasiya

    Menshikova, Olga

    Berkman, Elliot T.

 This research investigates how variation in sociality, or the degree to which  one feels belonging to a group, affects the propensity for participation in  collective action. By bringing together rich models of social behavior from  social psychology with decision modeling techniques from economics, these  mechanisms can ultimately foster cooperation in human societies. While  variation in the level of sociality surely exists across groups, little is  known about whether and how it changes behavior in the context of various  economic games. Specifically, we found some socialization task makes minimal  group members behavior resemble that of an established group. Consistent with  social identity theory, we discovered that inducing this type of minimal  sociality among participants who were previously unfamiliar with each other  increased social identity, and sustained cooperation rates in the newly  formed groups to the point that they were comparable to those in the already  established groups. Our results demonstrate that there are relatively simple  ways for individuals in a group to agree about appropriate social behavior,  delineate new shared norms and identities.

    Keywords: collective action, group formation, cooperation

    JEL: C01 D0 D23 D50

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:77758&r=soc

10. Can Television Reduce Xenophobia? The Case of East Germany

    Lars Hornuf

    Marc Oliver Rieger

 Can television have a mitigating effect on xenophobia? To examine this  question, we exploit the fact that individuals in some areas of East Germany  – due to their geographic location – could not receive West German television  until 1989. We conjecture that individuals who received West German  television were exposed more frequently to foreigners and thus have developed  less xenophobia than people who were not exposed to those programs. Our  results show that regions that could receive West German television were less  likely to vote for right-wing parties during the national elections from 1998  to 2013. Only recently, the same regions were also more likely to vote for  left-wing parties. Moreover, while counties that hosted more foreigners in

 1989 were also more likely to vote for right-wing parties in most elections,  we find counties that recently hosted more foreign visitors showed less  xenophobia, which is in line with intergroup contact theory.

    Keywords: Mass media, Television, Xenophobia, Attitudes towards foreigners, East Germany, Natural experiment

    JEL: D72 L82 P30

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trr:wpaper:201701&r=soc

11. Discrimination as favoritism: The private benefits and social costs of in-group favoritism in an experimental labor market

    David L. Dickinson (Appalachian State University, IZA, ESI)

    David Masclet (Université de Rennes 1, CREM, CNRS)

    Emmanuel Perterle (Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté, CRESE)  In this paper, we examine labor market favoritism in a unique laboratory  experiment design that can shed light on both the private benefits and  spillover costs of employer favoritism (or discrimination). Group identity is  induced on subjects such that each laboratory « society » consists of eight  individuals each belonging to one of two different identity groups. In some  treatments randomly assigned employer-subjects give preference rankings of  potential worker-subjects who would make effort choices that impact employer  payoffs. Though it is common knowledge that group identity in this  environment provides no special productivity information and cannot  facilitate communication or otherwise lower costs for the employer, employers  preferentially rank in-group members. In such instances, the unemployed  workers are aware that an intentional preference ranking resulted in their  unemployment. Unemployed workers are allowed to destroy resources in a final  stage of the game, which is a simple measure of the spillover effects of  favoritism in our design. Though we find evidence that favoritism may  privately benefit a firm in terms of higher worker effort, the spillover  costs that result highlight a reason to combat favoritism/discrimination.

 This result also identifies one potential micro-foundation of societal unrest  that may link back to labor market opportunity.

    Keywords: Discrimination, Experimental Economics, Social identity, Conflicts.

    JEL: C9 J24 J70

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crb:wpaper:2017-04&r=soc

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