NEP: New Economics Papers - Social Norms and Social Capital - Digest, Vol 82, Issue 3
In this issue we feature 6 current papers on the theme of social capital, chosen by Fabio Sabatini (Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”):
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- Social Capital and Prosocial Behaviour as Sources of Well-Being - John F. Helliwell; Lara B. Aknin; Hugh Shiplett; Haifang Huang; Shun Wang
- When Foul Play Seems Fair: Exploring the Link between Just Deserts and Honesty - Fabio Galeotti; Reuben Kline; Raimondello Orsini
- Education, social capital and political participation Evidence from school construction in Malian villages - Pierre André; Paul Maarek
- Are group members less inequality averse than individual decision makers? Haoran He; Marie Claire Villeval
- Trust and Economic Performance: A Panel Study - Xin, Guangyi
- Social Cohesion, Institutions and Public Policies: New Evidence from the MENA region - KASMAOUI, Kamal; ERRAMI, Youssef
1. Social Capital and Prosocial Behaviour as Sources of Well-Being
John F. Helliwell
Lara B. Aknin
Hugh Shiplett
Haifang Huang
Shun Wang
This paper surveys evidence documenting positive linkages among social capital, prosocial behaviour, and subjective well-being. Whether in the workplace, at home, in the community, or among nations, better and deeper social connections, and especially higher levels of trust are linked to higher subjective well-being, even beyond the effects flowing through higher incomes and better health. Prosocial behaviour is also shown to be a robust predictor of well-being in both correlational and experimental contexts.
These two lines of research are connected, as prosocial acts are most likely to increase well-being when they are delivered in ways that improve social capital, and reflect intentional generosity free of either compulsion or personal gain. We infer that these deep links between prosocial acts and well-being have an evolutionary benefit in maintaining the quality of social capital and thereby delivering cooperative human responses in times of crisis.
JEL: I31 O57 P16 Z13
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23761&r=soc
2. When Foul Play Seems Fair: Exploring the Link between Just Deserts and Honesty
Fabio Galeotti (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Etienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
Reuben Kline (SBU - Stony Brook University [The State University of New York])
Raimondello Orsini (DAIS - Computer Science - Universita di Venezia - Ca' Foscari)
The distributive justice norm of " just deserts " — i.e. the notion that one gets what one deserves — is an essential norm in a market society, and honesty is an important factor in economic and social exchange. We experimentally investigate the effect of violations of the distributive justice norm of " just deserts " on honesty in a setting where behaving dishonestly entails income redistribution. We find that the violation of the just deserts norm results in a greater propensity toward dishonesty. We then test a more general proposition that violations of just deserts induce dishonesty, even in cases where dishonesty does not have redistributive consequences. Our results confirm this proposition but only for cases in which the v iolation of just deserts also entails income inequality.
Keywords: Meritocracy, Equity, Dishonesty, Just Deserts, Experiment
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01579214&r=soc
3. Education, social capital and political participation Evidence from school construction in Malian villages
Pierre André
Paul Maarek (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA) Using a nationally representative household survey from Mali with retrospective information on school supply, we estimate the effect of opening new schools on education and on social capital formation. I compare the difference in educational attainment between individuals below and above the age of 9 at a school opening date using a quasi regression discontinuity design. School openings increase school enrollment; they also increase the participation in village associations and the involvement in local political life. The effect on political participation is concentrated in the eldest cohorts of the village with education, aged more than 40; this is not surprising: the eldest occupy a pivotal role in the social life of African villages. Also, the effect of education is concentrated on individuals belonging to a chief family of the village, so education seems to change local political power inside the dominant group of the village.
Keywords: Education, political participation, school openings, Mali
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ema:worpap:2017-18&r=soc
4. Are group members less inequality averse than individual decision makers?
Haoran He (School of Economics and Business Administration - Beijing Normal University)
Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Etienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS -
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who decide in isolation. Individuals express strategically more inequality aversion in their initial proposals in team decision-making because they anticipate the selfishness of other members. Members with median social preferences drive team decisions. Finally, we show that social image has little influence because guilt and envy are almost similar in anonymous and non-anonymous interactions.
Keywords: social image,experiment,Team,inequity aversion,preference aggregation
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00996545&r=soc
5. Trust and Economic Performance: A Panel Study
Xin, Guangyi
This paper critically reviews the current various measures of trust through surveys/questionnaires and trust experiments. The main shortcoming from such approaches is that the trust index produced from surveys and experiment are ambiguous. Given these arguments, I use Factor Analysis technique to construct a new trust index that account for indicators of degree of trust.
Consequently, the rankings of countries in my index is more consistent compared to the rankings of existing trust indices. Using the above, I illustrate the panel analysis on the influence of trust on FDI inflows and income inequality. Trust turns out to play a significant role on FDI inflows.
With regard to income inequality, trust is more pronounced among the OECD countries.
Keywords: Trust; Economic Performance; FDI inflow; Income Inequality
JEL: C23 D63 O11 Z13
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:80815&r=soc
6. Social Cohesion, Institutions and Public Policies: New Evidence from the MENA region
KASMAOUI, Kamal
ERRAMI, Youssef
This paper documents the effects of social cohesion and institutions on public policies in the MENA region using the three-stage least squares (3SLS) method for panel data to deal with the problems of simultaneity and correlation of errors. Our main findings show that the impact of social cohesion on public policies is strengthened only at high qualities of institutions. In other words, there is a threshold effect of institutions beyond which social cohesion has a positive impact on public policies.
Keywords: Social cohesion, Trust, Institutions, Public policies, 3SLS
JEL: H41 O10 O43
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:80950&r=soc
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