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NEP: New Economics Papers - Social Norms and Social Capital - Digest, Vol 83, Issue 1

In this issue we feature 5 current papers on the theme of social capital, chosen by Fabio Sabatini (Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”):

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  1. On the emergence of a sanctioning institution - Adriana Alventosa; Gonzalo Olcina
  2. Formal and informal household savings: how does trust in financial institutions influence the choice of saving instruments? Beckmann, Elisabeth; Mare, Davide Salvatore
  3. Taken by Storm: Hurricanes, Migrant Networks, and U.S. Immigration - Parag Mahajan; Dean Yang
  4. Relational Contracts, Competition and Innovation: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers - Calzolari, Giacomo; Felli, Leonardo; Koenen, Johannes; Spagnolo, Giancarlo; Stahl, Konrad
  5. Online Communities, Teams Characteristics, and Knowledge Quality - Amira Rezgui; Nicolas Jullien

1. On the emergence of a sanctioning institution

   Adriana Alventosa (Universidad de Valencia. ERI-CES)

   Gonzalo Olcina (ERICES and University of Valencia)  This paper theoretically studies the emergence of a sanctioning institution  in a selfish and wealth-diverse group where the provision of a public good is  realized only once. In particular, we present a public goods game where  players are given the opportunity to implement a sanctioning institution by  hiring an external enforcer which sanctions free-riding behavior. However,  the enforcer's effectiveness will not be guaranteed and will depend on the  level of effort he exerts to chase these opportunistic attitudes. Whether the  sanctioning institution is implemented or not is a task delegated to a  government concerned in its persistence, who will represent the interests of  a social class with a particular level of wealth. The emergence of the  sanctioning institution will depend on a set of institutional and  technological parameters, the wealth distribution in the society and the  identity of the social class whose interests are represented by the  government. Given these exogenous variables, the sanctioning institution will  emerge more easily if the government represents the social class with the  lowest opportunity cost in the provision of a public good. If implemented,  the sanctioning institution can achieve a positive provision of such good if  the society counts with a relatively high quality in its sanctioning  institutions and high social return of the public good. The case of  heterogeneous valuations of the public good will also be proved to show  symmetric results.

   Keywords: public goods game, cooperation, wealth inequality, pool punishment, moral hazard.

   JEL: C72 D02 H41

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dbe:wpaper:0417&r=soc

 

2. Formal and informal household savings: how does trust in financial institutions influence the choice of saving instruments?

   Beckmann, Elisabeth

   Mare, Davide Salvatore

 We investigate whether trust in different financial institutions influences  the choice of saving instruments. Is trust a significant determinant of  household saving behavior? How does trust in different financial institutions  affect the composition of household savings? Using unique survey data for ten  emerging market economies in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, we  show that trust in the financial system increases the probability of holding  formal savings and the diversification among formal saving instruments. Trust  in the financial system and in foreign banks are significantly associated  with holding contractual and capital market saving instruments. Trust in the  safety of deposit has the largest positive effect on bank savings. Trust in  domestic banks increases the likelihood of holding formal savings the most  and trust in foreign banks decreases holdings of informal savings the most.

   Keywords: Household finance; Formal savings; Informal savings; Trust in banks; Trust in the financial system.

   JEL: D12 D14 G11 O16 P34

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:81141&r=soc

 

3. Taken by Storm: Hurricanes, Migrant Networks, and U.S. Immigration

   Parag Mahajan

   Dean Yang

 How readily do potential migrants respond to increased returns to migration?

 Even if origin areas become less attractive vis-à-vis migration destinations,  fixed costs can prevent increased migration. We examine migration responses  to hurricanes, which reduce the attractiveness of origin locations.

 Restricted-access U.S. Census data allows precise migration measures and  analysis of more migrant-origin countries. Hurricanes increase U.S. immigration, with the effect increasing in the size of prior migrant stocks.

 Large migrant networks reduce fixed costs by facilitating legal immigration  from hurricane-affected source countries. Hurricane-induced immigration can  be fully accounted for by new legal permanent residents (“green card” holders).

   Keywords: Immigration, migrant networks, returns to migration, natural disasters, hurricanes

   JEL: F22 O15 Q54

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cen:wpaper:17-50&r=soc

 

4. Relational Contracts, Competition and Innovation: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers

   Calzolari, Giacomo

   Felli, Leonardo

   Koenen, Johannes

   Spagnolo, Giancarlo

   Stahl, Konrad

 Using unique data from buyer-supplier relationships in the German automotive  industry, we unveil a puzzle by which more trust in a relationship is  associated with higher idiosyncratic investment, but also more competition.

 We develop a theoretical model of repeated procurement with non-contractible,  buyer-specifi c investments rationalizing both observations. Against the idea  that competition erodes rents needed to build trust and sustain  relationships, we infer that trust and competition tend to go hand in hand.

 In our setting trust and rents from reduced supplier competition behave like  substitutes, rather than complements as typically understood.

   Keywords: Competition; Hold-up Problem; Innovation; Management Practices; Procurement; Relational Contracts; Specific Investment; Supply Chains; Trust

   JEL: D22 D86 L22 L62

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12267&r=soc

 

5. Online Communities, Teams Characteristics, and Knowledge Quality

   Amira Rezgui (LUSSI - Département Logique des Usages, Sciences sociales et Sciences de l'Information - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - Télécom Bretagne - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris], MARSOUIN - Môle Armoricain de Recherche sur la SOciété de l'information et des usages d'INternet - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - UBO - Université de Brest -Télécom Bretagne - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de Analyse de l'Information - Rennes - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - UR2 - Université Rennes 2, LEGO - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion de l'Ouest - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - UBO - Université de Brest - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - UBL - Université Bretagne Loire - IMT Atlantique -IMT Atlantique Bretagne-Pays de la Loire)

   Nicolas Jullien (LUSSI - Département Logique des Usages, Sciences sociales et Sciences de l'Information - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - Télécom Bretagne - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris], MARSOUIN - Môle Armoricain de Recherche sur la SOciété de l'information et des usages d'INternet - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UEB - Université européenne de  Bretagne - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - UBO - Université de Brest - Télécom Bretagne - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de Analyse de l'Information - Rennes - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - UR2 - Université Rennes 2, LEGO - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion de l'Ouest - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - UBO - Université de Brest - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - UBL - Université Bretagne Loire - IMT Atlantique - IMT Atlantique Bretagne-Pays de la Loire) 

Understanding the characteristics of a "good" team and members diversity  affects the outcomes group in a question of growing importance for the  organizations, for their competitive advantage relies more and more on  innovation, produced by virtual cooperation on knowledge production. In this  study, we propose a method to forecast the future quality of an online  knowledge production community ­or online epistemic community­ by studying  the composition of the group who initiated them (the "core members" of, in  this case, an article). First, we set a team building period which is defined  as the period of 120 days after article creation in order to construct this  "core members" group. Second, we explore the effects on article quality of  both group and member diversity. Core members' characteristics are learned  from their previous behavior. The analysis is based on the French Wikipedia  project. Our results show that the most important attributes of initial core  member to have a high quality article are average reputation, diversity's  contribution, participation, and group size. We also find no significant  effects of experience diversity and reputation during the team building  period.

   Keywords: Epistemic community,Article quality,Characteristics of the  team,Core member,Wikipedia

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01532045&r=soc


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