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NEP: New Economics Papers - Social Norms and Social Capital - Digest, Vol 58, Issue 1

In this issue we feature 14 current papers on the theme of social capital:

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In this issue we have:

  1. Keeping up with the e-Joneses: Do online social networks raise social comparisons? Sabatini, Fabio; Sarracino, Francesco
  2. Merchant Guilds, Taxation and Social Capital - Dessi, Roberta; Piccolo, Salvatore
  3. Do Social Networks Improve Chinese Adults' Subjective Well-being? Lei, Xiaoyan; Shen, Yan; Smith, James P.; Zhou, Guangsu
  4. Culture and Institutions - Alesina, Alberto; Giuliano, Paola
  5. Self-help groups, savings and social capital : evidence from a field experiment in Cambodia - Ban,Radu; Gilligan,Michael J.; Rieger,Matthias
  6. Competition vs. communication: An experimental study on restoring trust - Vivian Lei; David Masclet; Filip Vesely
  7. Conditional Cooperation and Betrayal Aversion - Cubitt, Robin; Gächter, Simon; Quercia, Simone
  8. Social Interactions, Mechanisms, and Equilibrium: Evidence from a Model of Study Time and Academic Achievement - Timothy Conley; Nirav Mehta; Ralph Stinebrickner; Todd Stinebrickner
  9. Preferences-dependent learning in the Centipede game - Astrid Gamba; Tobias Regner
  10. Social connectedness improves co-ordination on individually costly, efficient outcomes - Attanasi, Giuseppe; Hopfensitz, Astrid; Lorini, Emiliano; Moisan, Frédéric
  11. Trusting Former Rebels: An Experimental Approach to Understanding Reintegration after Civil War - Goone Beekman; Stephen Cheung; Ian Levely
  12. Reputation and social (dis)approval in feedback mechanisms: An experimental study - Marianne Lumeau; David Masclet; Thierry Penard
  13. Giving in France: A Philanthropic Renewal after Decades of Distrust - Arthur Gautier; Anne-Claire Pache; Valérie Mossel
  14. Moral Capital in the Twenty-First Century - Acs, Zoltan J.

1. Keeping up with the e-Joneses: Do online social networks raise social

     comparisons?

    Sabatini, Fabio

    Sarracino, Francesco

 Online social networks such as Facebook disclose an unprecedented volume of  personal information amplifying the occasions for social comparisons. We test  the hypothesis that the use of social networking sites (SNS) increases  people’s dissatisfaction with their income. After addressing endogeneity  issues, our results suggest that SNS users have a higher probability to  compare their achievements with those of others. This effect seems stronger  than the one exerted by TV watching, it is particularly strong for younger  people, and it affects men and women in a similar way.

    Keywords: social networks; social networking sites; social comparisons;

     satisfaction with income; relative deprivation.

    JEL: D3 D31 O33 Z13

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:65874&r=soc

 

 2. Merchant Guilds, Taxation and Social Capital

    Dessi, Roberta

    Piccolo, Salvatore

 We develop a theory of the emergence of merchant guilds as an efficient  mechanism to foster cooperation between merchants and rulers, building on the  complementarity between merchant guilds’ ability to enforce monopoly over  trade and their social capital. Unlike existing models, we focus on local  merchant guilds, rather than alien guilds, accounting for the main observed  features of their behavior, internal organization and relationship with  rulers. Our model delivers novel predictions about the emergence, variation,  functioning, and eventual decline of this highly successful historical form  of network. Our theory reconciles previous explanations and the large body of  historical evidence on medieval merchant guilds. In doing so, we also shed  novel light on the role of the guilds’ social capital, and its importance for  taxation, welfare, and the development of towns and their government in  medieval Europe.

    Keywords: Merchant guild, Social capital, collusion, Political economy,

     Trade, Taxation

    JEL: L20 L43 N7 N8

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:29364&r=soc

 

 3. Do Social Networks Improve Chinese Adults' Subjective Well-being?

    Lei, Xiaoyan (Peking University)

    Shen, Yan (Peking University)

    Smith, James P. (RAND)

    Zhou, Guangsu (Peking University)

 This paper studies relationships between social networks, health and  subjective well-being (SWB) using nationally representative data of the  Chinese Population – the Chinese Family Panel Studies (CFPS). Our data  contain SWB indicators in two widely used variants – happiness and  life-satisfaction. Social network variables used include kinship  relationships measured by marital status, family size, and having a  genealogy; ties with friends/relatives/neighbors measured by holiday  visitation, frequency of contacts, and whether and value gifts given and  received; total number and time spent in social activities, and engagement in  organizations including the communist party, religious groups, and other  types. We find that giving and receiving gifts has a larger impact on SWB  than either just giving or receiving them. Similarly the number of friends is  more important than number of relatives, and marriage is associated with  higher levels of SWB. Time spent in social activities and varieties of  activities both matter for SWB but varieties matters more. Participation in  organization is associated with higher SWB across such diverse groups as  being a member of the communist party or a religious organization. China  represents an interesting test since it is simultaneously a traditional  society with long-established norms about appropriate social networks and a  rapidly changing society due to substantial economic and demographic changes.

 We find that it is better to both give and receive, to engage in more types  of social activities, and that participation in groups all improves  well-being of Chinese people.

    Keywords: China, social networks, subjective well-being

    JEL: O10 O53

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9226&r=soc

 

 4. Culture and Institutions

    Alesina, Alberto (Harvard University)

    Giuliano, Paola (University of California, Los Angeles)  A growing body of empirical work measuring different types of cultural traits  has shown that culture matters for a variety of economic outcomes. This paper  focuses on one specific aspect of the relevance of culture: its relationship  to institutions. We review work with a theoretical, empirical, and historical  bent to assess the presence of a two-way causal effect between culture and  institutions.

    Keywords: culture, institutions

    JEL: P16 Z1

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9246&r=soc

 

 5. Self-help groups, savings and social capital : evidence from a field

     experiment in Cambodia

    Ban,Radu

    Gilligan,Michael J.

    Rieger,Matthias

 This paper studies how self-help groups?village-based organizations designed  to encourage savings, household production and social cohesion among the  poor?can promote economic and social capital. The paper uses survey data and  a wide array of social capital measures to assess the impact of a pilot  program that was randomly rolled out in rural villages in Cambodia. The study  finds that the program encouraged savings and associations via self-help  groups. However it did not improve social capital measured by household and  network surveys and lab activities that gauge trust, trustworthiness and the  willingness to contribute to public goods. The findings contradict recent  work that has found significant positive impacts of such groups on social  capital. This paper evaluates community-wide impacts while most previous  studies focus on program participants. In addition, the empirical strategy is  based on a broader array of social capital measures, including behavioral  indicators, suggesting that finding impacts of such programs on social  capital is sensitive to the measurement strategy.

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:7382&r=soc

 

 6. Competition vs. communication: An experimental study on restoring trust

    Vivian Lei (Department of Economics - University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee)

    David Masclet (CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse

     des organisations - UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal, CREM - Centre

     de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS - Université de Caen

     Basse-Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1)

    Filip Vesely (Department of Economics - University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee)  Trust is fragile. It is hard to build but easy to destroy. In this paper, we  explore the fragility of trust in a stylized laboratory environment. We ask  whether transgression outside a direct send-and-return relationship destroys  trust and, if so, whether a competition against outsiders or an apology for  misdeeds helps restore it. We find that transgression significantly reduces  trust and that the broken trust can be greatly restored by group competition.

 Communication via an apology, impersonal or not, has an insignificant impact.

 By contrast, offering explanations for misbehavior is as effective as group  competition.

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01074083&r=soc

 

 7. Conditional Cooperation and Betrayal Aversion

    Cubitt, Robin (University of Nottingham)

    Gächter, Simon (University of Nottingham)

    Quercia, Simone (University of Bonn)  We investigate whether there is a link between conditional cooperation and  betrayal aversion. We use a public goods game to classify subjects by type of  contribution preference and by belief about the contributions of others; and  we measure betrayal aversion for different categories of subject. We find  that, among conditional cooperators, only those who expect others to  contribute little to the public good are significantly betrayal averse, while  there is no evidence of betrayal aversion for those who expect substantial  contributions by others. This is consistent with their social risk taking in  public goods games, as the pessimistic conditional cooperators tend to avoid  contribution to avoid exploitation, whereas the optimistic ones typically  contribute to the public good and thus take the social risk of being  exploited.

    Keywords: exploitation aversion, betrayal aversion, trust, conditional

     cooperation, public goods game, free riding, experiments

    JEL: H41 C91 C72 D03

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9241&r=soc

 

 8. Social Interactions, Mechanisms, and Equilibrium: Evidence from a Model of

     Study Time and Academic Achievement

    Timothy Conley

    Nirav Mehta

    Ralph Stinebrickner

    Todd Stinebrickner

 We develop and estimate an equilibrium model of study time choices of  students on a social network. We examine how network structure interacts with  student characteristics to affect academic achievement. Due to data  limitations, few papers examine the mechanisms through which peer effects  operate. The model is designed to exploit unique data collected in the Berea  Panel Study. Study time data allow us to quantify an intuitive mechanism for  social interactions: the cost of own study time may depend on friend study  time. Social network data allow study time choices and resulting academic  achievement to be embedded in an equilibrium framework. We find friend study  time strongly affects own study time, and, therefore, student achievement.

 Not taking into account equilibrium behavior would drastically understate the  effect of peers. Sorting on friend characteristics appears important in  explaining variation across students in study time and achievement, and  determines the aggregate achievement level.

    JEL: H0 I20 J0

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21418&r=soc

 

 9. Preferences-dependent learning in the Centipede game

    Astrid Gamba (University of Milan-Bicocca, Milan, Italy)

    Tobias Regner (School of Economics and Business Administration,

     Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena)  We study experimentally whether heterogeneity of behavior in the Centipede  game can be interpreted as the result of a learning process of individuals  with different preference types (more and less pro-social) and coarse  information regarding the opponent's past behavior. We manipulate the quality  of information feedbacks provided after each play. If subjects rely only on  their personal database, long run behavior resembles a Self-confirming  equilibrium whereby less pro-social types take at earlier nodes due to  prediction errors. Aggregate information release decreases heterogeneity of  behavior by increasing the passing rates of pro-selfs and play moves towards  Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

    Keywords: social preferences, learning, Self-confirming equilibrium,

     experiment

    JEL: C71 C73 C91 D83

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2015-012&r=soc

 

10. Social connectedness improves co-ordination on individually costly,

     efficient outcomes

    Attanasi, Giuseppe

    Hopfensitz, Astrid

    Lorini, Emiliano

    Moisan, Frédéric

    Keywords: Social ties, Group identity, Coordination, Experiment

    JEL: C72 C91 C92

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:29369&r=soc

 

11. Trusting Former Rebels: An Experimental Approach to Understanding

     Reintegration after Civil War

    Goone Beekman (Wageningen University, Development Economics Group, P.O.

     Box 8130, 6700 EW Wageningen, Netherlands)

    Stephen Cheung (The University of Sydney, School of Economics, Merewether

     Building H04, Sydney NSW 2006, Australia)

    Ian Levely (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences,

     Charles University in Prague, Smetanovo nábreží 6, 111 01 Prague 1, Czech

     Republic)

 We study cooperation within and between groups in the laboratory, comparing  treatments in which two groups have previously been (i) in conflict with one  another, (ii) in conflict with a different group, or (iii) not previously  exposed to con flict. We model conflict using an inter-group Tullock contest,  and measure its effects upon cooperation using a multi-level public good  game. We demonstrate that con flict increases cooperation within groups,  while decreasing cooperation between groups. Moreover, we find that  cooperation between groups increases in response to an increase in the  effciency gains from cooperation only when the two groups have not previously  interacted.

    Keywords: within- and between-group cooperation; inter-group confl ict;

     group identity; multi-level public good experiment; Tullock contest;

     other-regarding preferences

    JEL: C92 D64 D74 H41

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2015_16&r=soc

 

12. Reputation and social (dis)approval in feedback mechanisms: An

     experimental study

    Marianne Lumeau (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord -

     Université Paris 13 - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité (USPC) - CNRS, CREM -

     Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS - Université de Caen

     Basse-Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1)

    David Masclet (CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse

     des organisations - UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal, CREM - Centre

     de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS - Université de Caen

     Basse-Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1)

    Thierry Penard (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management -

     CNRS - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1)  Several previous studies have highlighted the role of feedback mechanisms in  the success of electronic marketplaces. This paper contends that the  effectiveness of online feedback mechanisms passes through two channels,  namely a ‘reputational’ effect that has been largely documented in the  literature, but also a ‘(dis)approval’ effect that has received less  attention. We attempt to isolate these two effects using an experimental  approach. For this purpose, we compare two experimental feedback systems that  differ in the set of information available to participants. In the first  feedback system, each player can observe the feedback profile of the other  party, whereas in the second feedback system, this information is private.

 Our findings indicate that both systems improve cooperation. However, we  observe that private feedback is less efficient in enhancing trust and  trustworthiness than systems in which rating profiles are observed by  partners. This finding is due to both a reduction of the number of assigned  ratings and a lower impact of private ratings on subsequent decisions. All  these results suggest that even if social (dis)approval matters, rating  observability–and thus reputation–remains critical to induce honest behavior  and improve efficiency in markets characterized by imperfect information.

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01116889&r=soc

 

13. Giving in France: A Philanthropic Renewal after Decades of Distrust

    Arthur Gautier (Chaire entrepreneuriat social - Essec Business School)

    Anne-Claire Pache (Public and Private Policy Department - Essec Business

     School)

    Valérie Mossel (Rotterdam School of Management - Erasmus university)  In this paper, we provide an outline of the philanthropic landscape in France  and analyze the results of a 2009 survey of 4,612 French households about  their giving patterns. In the first part, we synthesize knowledge on the  history of philanthropy in France, its size and scope, government policy and  regulation as well as elements of cultural context. In the second part of the  paper, we present a quantitative analysis of recent giving survey data in  France, highlighting several determinants on the likelihood to give and the  amount donated. Trust towards others, religious beliefs, secondary education,  old age and home ownership seem to be the strongest determinants for giving  in France. This chapter will be part of the forthcoming Palgrave Research  Companion to Global Philanthropy, edited by Pamala Wiepking and Femida Handy.

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00914805&r=soc

 

14. Moral Capital in the Twenty-First Century

    Acs, Zoltan J. (London School of Economics)  This paper recasts Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century in light of  Acs’ Why Philanthropy Matters: How the Wealthy Give and What It Means for Our  Economic Well-Being. Philanthropy matters in this debate because, as moral  capital, philanthropy offers an alternative solution to the Piketty  conundrum, and it does so without relying exclusively on a wealth tax and  government intervention. Moral capital over the centuries strengthened both  capitalism and democracy by investing in opportunity (slavery, suffrage and  civil rights), which in turn leads to long-term economic growth and greater  equality. By focusing on university research—which is critical in promoting  technological innovation, economic equality, and economic security—that  creates a large, well-functioning middle class (The Economist, March 2015),  moral capital represents the missing link in the theory of capitalism  development.

    Keywords: philanthropy; competition; education; opportunity;

     entrepreneurship; innovation; inequality; Piketty

    JEL: J24 L26 O20 P16

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cesisp:0418&r=soc


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