In this issue we feature 12 current papers on the theme of social capital:

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In this issue we have:

1. Learning to trust, learning to be trustworthy - Ulrich Berger
2. Pharaohs of the deep state: Social capital in an obstinate regime - Clevers, Marijn; Nimeh, Zinah
3. Other regarding preferences and reciprocity:insights from experimental findings and satisfaction data - Leonardo Becchetti; Vittorio Pelligra; Serena F. Taurino
4. Cheating in the Lab Predicts Fraud in the Field: An Experiment in Public Transportations - Zhixin Dai; Fabio Galeotti; Marie Claire Villeval
5. Gossip and the efficiency of interactions - Dietmar Fehr; Matthias Sutter
6. Market Competition and Efficient Cooperation - Jordi Brandts; Arno Riedl
7. Incentivizing Pro-social Behavior in Governance: The Effects of Revealing Peer Rankings on Voluntary Service -  Villas-Boas, Sofia B; Taylor, Rebecca; Deakin, Elizabeth
8. Gender differences in Socially Responsible Consumption. An Experimental Investigation - L. Becchetti; V. Pelligra; F. Salustri; A. Vásquez
9. Are Women Naturaliter More Cooperative? An Experimental Investigation of the Vote-with-the-Wallet Game - L. Becchetti; V. Pelligra; A. Vásquez
10. Infrastructure, Incentives and Institutions - Nava Ashraf; Edward L. Glaeser; Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto
11. The impact of Online ICT on the dimensions of social capital - Serkan Gürsoy
12. Why does birthplace matter so much? Sorting, learning and geography - Bosquet, Clément; Overman, Henry G

 1. Learning to trust, learning to be trustworthy

    Ulrich Berger (Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and

     Business)

 Interpersonal trust is a one-sided social dilemma.Building on the binary  trust game, we ask how trust and trustworthiness can evolve in a population  where partners are matched randomly and agents sometimes act as trustors and  sometimes as trustees. Trustors have the option to costly check a trustee's  last action and to condition their behavior on the signal they receive. We  show that the resulting population game admits two components of Nash  equilibria. Nevertheless, the long-run outcome of an evolutionary social  learning process modeled by the best response dynamics is unique. Even if  unconditional distrust initially abounds, the trustors' checking option leads  trustees to build a reputation for trustworthiness by honoring trust. This  invites free-riders among the trustors who save the costs of checking and  trust blindly, until it does no longer pay for trustees to behave in a  trustworthy manner. This results in cyclical convergence to a mixed  equilibrium with behavioral heterogeneity where suspicious checking and blind  trusting coexist while unconditional distrust vanishes.

    Keywords: trust game, evolutionary game theory, reputation, best response

     dynamics

    JEL: C72 C90

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wiwwuw:wuwp212&r=soc

 2. Pharaohs of the deep state: Social capital in an obstinate regime

    Clevers, Marijn (University College Maastricht, Maastricht University)

    Nimeh, Zinah (UNU-MERIT, Maastricht University)  The paper aims to analyse the process of 'democratisation' or lack thereof  after the 2011 Egyptian Arab Spring uprisings in the context of 'social  capital'. While popular demand for reform toppled Hosni Mubarak in 2011, the  transition period that followed showed the determination of regime remnants  and the deep state, to preserve the underlying institutional structures of an  entrenched authoritarian system. Mubarak's power base was grounded in a  complicated system of interwoven relationships which entailed economic,  social and political benefits. This social structure is analysed under the  umbrella term 'social capital' to give an account of which network(s) pulled  the cart in the pursuit of a contra democratic political agenda. A critical  analysis of literature, relevant to the aim of the paper, is provided. Social  capital is defined as the generalisation of norms and reciprocity which  results from individuals' engagement in social networks. A general account on  the most important social networks in Egypt is provided in the context of a  military dominated social contract established after the 1952 military coup.

 This analysis concludes that the existing social capital network structure  fostered and continues to foster the preservation of the authoritarian status  quo. The transition period after the ousting of Mubarak presents a clear  illustration of this. The well-embeddedness and the interdisciplinary nature  of the deep in state in Egypt's power institutional structure were never  eradicated, since the deep state restricted the interference of any  'non-conforming' entities in politics. The Egyptian deep state can be seen as  self-sufficient, their penetration in every realm of society enables them to  balance off adversaries when needed. The contribution of this paper is  twofold. First, it attempts to show that authoritarianism is preserved when  an elitists power network is established which thrives as a direct  consequence of the underlying institutional structure. Secondly, it argues  that social capital structures can produce an environment which is  unfavourable to democratic development.

    Keywords: Social capital, democratization, Arab Spring, Egypt, institutional structures, social networks

    JEL: I30 I38 O17 N40 N45

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:unumer:2015056&r=soc

 3. Other regarding preferences and reciprocity:insights from experimental findings and satisfaction data.

    Leonardo Becchetti (CEIS, University of Rome Tor Vergata)

    Vittorio Pelligra (University of Cagliari, CRENoS)

    Serena F. Taurino (University of Rome Tor Vergata)  We measure satisfaction about experimental outcomes, personal and other  participants' behaviour after a multiperiod "hybrid contribution" multiplayer  prisoner's dilemma called the "vote with the wallet" game. Our work shows  that participants who cooperated above median (which we define as strong cooperators) are significantly more satisfied with the game in proportion to  their cooperative choice. On the contrary, their satisfaction for the other  players' behavior is negatively correlated with the extent of their own  cooperative behavior and the non-cooperative behavior of the latter. The  satisfaction of strong cooperators for their behavior in the game depends in  turn on the share of their own cooperative choices. We document that a  broader utility function including heterogeneity in expectations on other  players' behavior, other-regarding preferences, and a negative reciprocity  argument may account for the combination of the observed experimental and  satisfaction findings.

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:363&r=soc

 4. Cheating in the Lab Predicts Fraud in the Field: An Experiment in Public Transportations

    Zhixin Dai (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St

     Etienne,F-69130 Ecully, France)

    Fabio Galeotti (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE

     Lyon St Etienne,F-69130 Ecully, France)

    Marie Claire Villeval (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS,

     GATE Lyon St Etienne,F-69130 Ecully, France)  We conduct an artefactual field experiment using a diversified sample of  passengers of public transportations to study attitudes towards dishonesty.

 We find that the diversity of behavior in terms of dis/honesty in laboratory  tasks and in the field correlate. Moreover, individuals who have just been  fined in the field behave more honestly in the lab than the other  fare-dodgers, except when context is introduced. Overall, we show that simple  tests of dishonesty in the lab can predict moral firmness in life, although  frauders who care about social image cheat less when behavior can be verified  ex post by the experimenter.

    Keywords: Dishonesty, fare-dodging, field experiment, external validity, public transportations

    JEL: B41 C91 C93 K42

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1605&r=soc

 5. Gossip and the efficiency of interactions

    Dietmar Fehr

    Matthias Sutter

 Human communication in organizations often involves a large amount of  gossiping about others. Here we study in an experiment whether gossip affects  the efficiency of human interactions. We let subjects play a trust game.

 Third parties observe a trustee?s behavior and can gossip about it by sending  a message to the trustor with whom the observed trustee will be paired (for  the first time) in the next round. While messages are non-verifiable and  sometimes also incorrect, the possibility of gossip is highly  efficiency-increasing compared to a situation without any gossip. In two  further control treatments, we show that the mere fact of being observed by  third parties cannot explain the efficiency-increasing effect of gossip, and  that noisy gossip (where information transmission from third parties to  trustors can fail) still increases efficiency, but less so than if  information transmission is undisturbed.

    Keywords: gossip, communication, trust game, efficiency

    JEL: C72 C92

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2016-03&r=soc

 6. Market Competition and Efficient Cooperation

    Jordi Brandts

    Arno Riedl

 We use laboratory experiments to study the causal effects of favorable and  unfavorable competitive market experience on cooperation in a subsequent  social dilemma game. The issues we study are part of the broader topic of  whether there are behavioral spillovers between different spheres of social  interactions. Market interaction takes place in a continuous double auction  market in which one side of the market obtains the larger part of the  surplus. We examine the efficiency of subsequent cooperation for pairs of  market-winners, market-losers and mixed pairs and study both the cases where  interaction in the social dilemma is with others from the same market,  'market-partners', and where it is with others from another market,  'market-strangers', and compare it with benchmark behavior in a stand-alone  social dilemma game. We find that in market-partners, market experience has  adverse effects on the efficiently of cooperation on both market-winner and  market-loser pairs. In market-strangers, pairs of market-winners manage to  cooperate more efficiently. These results indicate that it is not market  experience per se that lowers the ability to cooperate. Rather, having  competed for scarce resources on the same side of the market makes it  difficult to overcome the social dilemma and positive market experience  fosters cooperation only for those who did not have to compete with each  other. We also show that differences in cooperation cannot be explained by  ex-ante income differences and find that market experience also affects  subjective well-being and social value orientation.

    Keywords: competition, cooperation, experiments

    JEL: A13 C92 D30 J50 M50

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:868&r=soc

 7. Incentivizing Pro-social Behavior in Governance: The Effects of Revealing Peer Rankings on Voluntary Service

    Villas-Boas, Sofia B

    Taylor, Rebecca

    Deakin, Elizabeth

    Keywords: Physical Sciences and Mathematics

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt9kz083jj&r=soc

 8. Gender differences in Socially Responsible Consumption. An Experimental Investigation

    L. Becchetti

    V. Pelligra

    F. Salustri

    A. Vásquez

 We report on a simple experimental study designed to investigate the  different gender attitudes towards socially responsible consumption. We use  the Vote-with-the-Wallet Game (VWG), a version of a repeated multiplayer  prisoner’s dilemma that mimics the characteristics of the choice between a  conventional and a socially responsible product. More precisely we test the  effect of three factors - two different frames and an ex-post redistribution  mechanism that transfers resources from purely self-interested consumers to  responsible ones. We find that women remain significantly more cooperative  (choosing more often the responsible good) when the redistribution mechanism  is interrupted and are significantly less satisfied about the behavior of the  other players in that treatment.

    Keywords: Responsible Consumption, Gender Differences, social preferences, lab experiment

    JEL: C72 C92

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cns:cnscwp:201603&r=soc

 9. Are Women Naturaliter More Cooperative? An Experimental Investigation of the Vote-with-the-Wallet Game

    L. Becchetti

    V. Pelligra

    A. Vásquez

 We test for the existence of gender effects in a “vote with the wallet” multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma. Statics tests and dynamic econometric  estimates find that women cooperate significantly more when we start with the  baseline version of the game without introducing institutional legality  frames, ex post redistribution schemes and conformity information designs.

 Women therefore reveal themselves as naturaliter more cooperative.

    Keywords: Gender Effects, lab experiment, Redistribution, conformity

    JEL: C92 D7 D73 H2

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cns:cnscwp:201602&r=soc

10. Infrastructure, Incentives and Institutions

    Nava Ashraf

    Edward L. Glaeser

    Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto

 Cities generate negative, as well as positive, externalities; addressing  those externalities requires both infrastructure and institutions. Providing  clean water and removing refuse requires water and sewer pipes, but the urban  poor are often unwilling to pay for the costs of that piping. Standard  welfare economics teaches us that either subsidies or Pigouvian fines can  solve that problem, but both solution are problematic when institutions are  weak. Subsidies lead to waste and corruption; fines lead to extortion of the  innocent. Zambia has attempted to solve its problem with subsidies alone, but  the subsidies have been too small to solve the “last-mile problem” and so  most poor households remain unconnected to the water and sewer system. In  nineteenth-century New York, subsidies also proved insufficient and were  largely replaced by a penalty-based system. We present a model that  illustrates the complementarity between infrastructure and institutions and  provides conditions for whether fines, subsidies or a combination of both are  the optimal response. One point of the model is that the optimal fine is  often not a draconian penalty, but a mild charge that is small enough to  avoid extortion.

    Keywords: public health, infrastructure, institutions, subsidies, fines, last-mile problem

    JEL: O18 R53 O21 H41 I18 N91

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:873&r=soc

11. The impact of Online ICT on the dimensions of social capital

    Serkan Gürsoy (Beykoz Vocational School of Logistics)  This study aims to investigate the impact of information and communication  technologies on social capital. It evaluates ICT in terms of “knowledge  sharing.” Similarly, social capital is taken into consideration in terms of  organizational context. Within such a framework, constructs affiliated with  these two concepts have been investigated. This investigation shows that  communication technologies and social media technologies do have similar as  well as varied impacts on dimensions of social capital. These impacts stem  from the developments in the social elements of ICT. Moreover, variations in  these elements are reflected as variations in the dimensions of developed  social capital between communities with face-to-face interaction and the ones  who have not yet achieved face-to-face interaction. This study also reveals  that the social capital observed in face-to-face interaction can as well be  seen online communities.

    Keywords: Social capital, Information and Communication Technologies

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:met:stpswp:1401&r=soc

12. Why does birthplace matter so much? Sorting, learning and geography

    Bosquet, Clément

    Overman, Henry G

 We consider the link between birthplace and wages. Using a unique panel  dataset we estimate a raw elasticity of wage with respect to birthplace size  of 4.6%, two thirds of the 6.8% raw elasticity with respect to city size. We  consider a number of mechanisms through which this birthplace effect could  arise. Our results suggest that inter-generational transmission (sorting) and  the effect of birthplace on current location (geography) both play a role in  explaining the effect of birthplace. We find no role for human capital  formation at least in terms of educational outcomes (learning). Our results  highlight the importance of intergenerational sorting in helping explain the  persistence of spatial disparities.

    Keywords: lifetime mobility; place of birth; spatial sorting

    JEL: J31 J61 J62 R23

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11085&r=soc

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