In this issue we feature 9 current papers on the theme of social capital, chosen by Fabio Sabatini (Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”):

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1. From Immigrants to Americans: Race and Assimilation during the Great - Migration - Vasiliki Fouka; Soumyajit Mazumder; Marco Tabellini
2. Are we more honest than others think we are? - Claire Mouminoux; Jean-Louis Rulli?re
3. Trust somebody but choose carefully : an empirical analysis of social relationships on an exchange market - Sylvain Mignot; Annick Vignes
4. The effects of status mobility and group identity on trust - R?mi Suchon; Marie Claire Villeval
5. Media's Role in the Making of a Democrat: Evidence from East Germany - Tim Friehe; Helge M?ller; Florian Neumeier
6. Broadband Internet and Social Capital - Andrea Geraci; Mattia Nardotto; Tommaso Reggiani; Fabio Sabatini
7. Cooperation and Endogenous Repetition in an Infinitely Repeated Social Dilemma: Experimental Evidence - Kamei, Kenju
8. Peer Punishment in Repeated Isomorphic Give and Take Social Dilemmas - Abhijit Ramalingam; Antonio J. Morales; James M. Walker
9. Recovering social networks from panel data: identification, simulations and an application - ?ureo de Paula; Imran Rasul; Pedro CL Souza

1. From Immigrants to Americans: Race and Assimilation during the Great

    Migration

  Vasiliki Fouka (Stanford University); Soumyajit Mazumder (Harvard

   University); Marco Tabellini (Harvard Business School)  How does the appearance of a new out-group affect the economic, social and  cultural integration of previous outsiders? We study this question in the  context of the first Great Migration (1915-1930), when 1.5 million African  Americans moved from the US South to urban centers in the North, where 30  million Europeans had arrived since 1850. We test the hypothesis that black  inflows led to the establishment of a binary black-white racial  classification, and facilitated the incorporation of - previously racially  ambiguous - European immigrants into the white majority. We exploit variation  induced by the interaction between 1900 settlements of southern-born blacks  in northern cities and state-level outmigration from the US South after 1910.

 Black arrivals increased both the effort exerted by immigrants to assimilate  and their eventual Americanization. These average effects mask substantial

 heterogeneity: while initially less integrated groups (i.e. Southern and  Eastern Europeans) exerted more assimilation effort, assimilation success was  larger for those that were culturally closer to native whites (i.e. Western  and Northern Europeans). These patterns are consistent with a framework in  which changing perceptions of out-group distance among native whites lower  the barriers to the assimilation of white immigrants.

  JEL: J11 J15 N32

  Keywords: Immigration, assimilation, Great Migration, race, group identity.

  Date: 2019?02?04

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csl:devewp:445&r=soc

2. Are we more honest than others think we are?

  Claire Mouminoux (SAF - Laboratoire de Sciences Actuarielle et Financi?re -

   UCBL - Universit? Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Universit? de Lyon); Jean-Louis

   Rulli?re (SAF - Laboratoire de Sciences Actuarielle et Financi?re - UCBL -

   Universit? Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Universit? de Lyon)  While the laws are justified on the basis of the efficiency they provide to  society, policy makers and researchers focus on the reasons why people  violate the law. Crimes and violations induce directly costs. But there is  another indirect costs that is generally ignored : the fact that a person can  violate the law (whether it does or not) can reduce trust in one's honesty.

 Thus, even if the economic agent is honest and respects the law, this loss of  confidence, which could be unfounded, is also a source of inefficiency. We  introduce in an experiment, a normative rule of "decision" in order to elicit  both honesty and beliefs about honesty from subjects in the lab. There is no  direct transfer of money between both part to avoid any inequality aversion  or altruism aversion. The main question remains how individuals trust in the  honesty of an anonymous group. Subjects are split into two groups : those who  are subject to the temptation of (unverifiable) dishonesty and those who  value the dishonesty of others. We inform each participant that we cannot  identify defection. We find an important heterogeneity of trust in honesty  through subjects. On average, subjects A suggests that participants B are  more honest than they are. Moreover, we identify distortion of effective  honesty and beliefs about other honesty when the environment of players A is  unfavorable.

  Keywords: Behavioral economics,Trust measurement,Honesty,Experiment

  Date: 2019?01?30

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01999536&r=soc

3. Trust somebody but choose carefully : an empirical analysis of social

    relationships on an exchange market

  Sylvain Mignot (LEM - Lille - Economie et Management - UCL - Universit?

   catholique de Lille - Universit? de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la

   Recherche Scientifique); Annick Vignes (CAMS - Centre d'Analyse de

   Math?matiques sociales)

 This article analyses the influence of trust on the functioning of a market  for perishable goods, where there exists no quality signal and quantities can  be scarce. On this market, agents can choose between bidding or exchanging  through bilateral transactions. It is well accepted in economy that trust  plays an important role in transactions but its definition and measurement  stay, as far as we know, very elusive. Starting from the empirical analysis  of a market with a peculiar organization, the Boulogne-sur-mer fish market,  where people have the choice between trading through auctions or bilateral  exchanges, we propose a measurement of trust, based on the dynamics of  agents' encounters. We then analyze the differences in the social network  structures and estimate how they affects the market outcomes. We bring into  the light that, when the transaction links on the auction market reflects the  economic constraints of the partners, the relationships on the bilateral  market depends on something more. Clearly, the prices of the bilateral  transactions are the consequences of economics and non economics  determinants. At first glance, the stable coexistence of two market  structures looks like a paradox. Our results help to understand the  distinctive characteristics and functioning of each sub-market. This  discussion contributes to the debate about the efficiency of market  structures.

 Cette article analyse l'influence de la confiance sur le fonctionnement d'un  march? sur lequel se vend un bien p?rissable dont la ressource est contrainte  et pour lequel il n'existe pas de signal de qualit?. Sur ce march?, les  ventes se font aux ench?res ou ? travers un processus bilat?ral. Si  l'influence significative de la confiance sur le fonctionnement d'un march?

 est largement reconnue en ?conomie, sa d?finition et sa mesure restent encore  tr?s vagues. A partir de l'analyse empirique d'un march? au poisson, nous  proposons un indicateur de confiance et montrons comment celle-ci agit  diff?remment selon le mode de vente du bien. Nous mettons en ?vidence que,  quand la fixation des prix aux ench?res r?sulte d'un jeu ?conomique, les  relations sociales entre les agents influent les prix auxquels les biens  s'?changent sur le march? de gr? ? gr?.

  Keywords: market design,trust,social networks JEL codes: L14,D85,D47,L14

  Date: 2019?01?10

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02005026&r=soc

4. The effects of status mobility and group identity on trust

  R?mi Suchon (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE L-SE UMR 5824, F-69131 Ecully, France);

   Marie Claire Villeval (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE L-SE UMR 5824, F-69131 Ecully,

   France)

 In a laboratory experiment we test the interaction effects of status and  group identity on interpersonal trust. Natural group identity is generated by  school affiliation. Status (expert or agent) is awarded based on relative  performance in a math quiz that is ex ante less favorable to the subjects  from one group. We find that "promoted" trustors (individuals from the  disadvantaged group that nevertheless achieve the status of expert) trust  less both in-group and out-group trustees, compared to the other members of  their group. Rather than playing against the effects of natural group  identity, status promotion singles-out individuals. In contrast,  trustworthiness is not affected by status and there is no evidence that  interacting with promoted individuals impacts trust or trustworthiness.

  JEL: C92 D91 J62

  Keywords: Trust, status, group identity, social mobility, experiment

  Date: 2019

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1901&r=soc

5. Media's Role in the Making of a Democrat: Evidence from East Germany

  Tim Friehe; Helge M?ller; Florian Neumeier  This paper explores the causal influence of media content on voting behavior.

 We exploit a natural experiment involving access to West German TV within the  German Democratic Republic. Focusing on federal and state election outcomes  in the post-reunification decade (i.e., a time at which TV content was  harmonized), we find that municipalities that had access to Western TV  broadcasts before reunification have lower vote shares for left-wing and  right-wing extremist parties. With regard to potential channels, we provide  evidence based on survey data that GDR citizens with access to West German TV  were less loyal to the socialist regime, less hostile toward foreigners, and  exhibited higher levels of social capital. Our findings thus support the  notion that access to free media influences political attitudes and  facilitates the consolidation of democracy.

  JEL: D72 L82 P30

  Keywords: voting, extremism, television, media, natural experiment, Germany

  Date: 2019

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7485&r=soc

6. Broadband Internet and Social Capital

  Andrea Geraci (European Commission JRC); Mattia Nardotto (KU Leuven);

   Tommaso Reggiani (Masaryk University); Fabio Sabatini (Sapienza University

   of Rome)

 We study how the diffusion of broadband Internet affects social capital using  two data sets from the UK. Our empirical strategy exploits the fact that  broadband access has long depended on customers? position in the voice  telecommunication infrastructure that was designed in the 1930s. The actual  speed of an Internet connection, in fact, rapidly decays with the distance of  the dwelling from the specific node of the network serving its area. Merging  unique information about the topology of the voice network with geocoded  longitudinal data about individual social capital, we show that access to  broadband Internet caused a significant decline in forms of offline  interaction and civic engagement. Overall, our results suggest that broadband  penetration substantially crowded out several aspects of social capital.

  JEL: C91 D9 D91 Z1

  Keywords: ICT, broadband infrastructure, networks, Internet, social

   capital, civic capital

  Date: 2018?12

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mub:wpaper:2018-01&r=soc

7. Cooperation and Endogenous Repetition in an Infinitely Repeated Social

    Dilemma: Experimental Evidence

  Kamei, Kenju

 Exogenously imposed infinite repetition is known to mitigate people?s  uncooperative behaviors in dilemma situations with partner matching through  personal enforcement. One as yet unanswered question is whether people  collectively choose to interact with each other under the partner matching  condition when there exists an alternative possibility under random matching.

 In an indefinitely repeated public goods game framework, I let subjects  democratically choose whether to (i) play with pre-assigned specific others  for all rounds or to (ii) play with randomly matched counterparts in every  round. The experimental results revealed that most groups collectively opt  for the partner matching protocol. The data also indicated that groups  achieve a higher level of cooperation when they democratically select the  partner matching protocol by voting, relative to when the same option is  exogenously imposed. These findings imply that people?s equilibrium selection  may be affected by how the basic rules of games are introduced (endogenously  or exogenously). The paper provides further evidence to suggest that the  positive effect of democratic decision-making is stronger when the majority  voting rule, rather than the unanimity rule, is applied.

  JEL: C72 C73 C92 H41

  Keywords: experiment, public goods, cooperation, dilemma, social norms,

   endogenous choices

  Date: 2019?02?09

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:92097&r=soc

8. Peer Punishment in Repeated Isomorphic Give and Take Social Dilemmas

  Abhijit Ramalingam; Antonio J. Morales; James M. Walker  This study brings together two strands of experimental literature, ?Give and  Take? versions of strategically and payoff isomorphic linear public goods  games and the effectiveness of peer punishment in promoting cooperation in  repeated fixed-group game settings. We find evidence of lower cooperation in  the Take game setting, primarily due to a greater decrease in cooperation in  later decision rounds. Importantly, we also find that peer punishment is able  to overcome the decrease in cooperation in the Take game, leading to greater  relative increases in cooperation and earnings. Overall, with punishment, we  observe efficiency gains in the Take game, but not in the Give game. This  result is linked to the fact that low contributors in their respective groups  are targeted for punishment more frequently in the Take game than in the Give  game. Key Words: isomorphic, social dilemma, experiment, cooperation,  punishment, reciprocal preferences

  JEL: C72 C91 C92 D02 H41

  Date: 2018

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apl:wpaper:18-15&r=soc

9. Recovering social networks from panel data: identification, simulations

    and an application

  ?ureo de Paula (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University College

   London); Imran Rasul (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University College

   London and IFS); Pedro CL Souza (Institute for Fiscal Studies)  It is almost self-evident that social interactions can determine economic  behavior and outcomes. Yet, information on social ties does not exist in most  publicly available and widely used datasets. We present results on the  identification of social networks from observational panel data that contains  no information on social ties between agents. In the context of a canonical  social interactions model, we provide sufficient conditions under which the  social interactions matrix, endogenous and exogenous social effect parameters  are all globally identified. While this result is relevant across different  estimation strategies, we then describe how high-dimensional estimation  techniques can be used to estimate the model based on the Adaptive Elastic  Net GMM method. We showcase the method and its robustness in Monte Carlo  simulations using stylized and real world network structures. Finally, we  employ the method to study tax competition across US states. We find the  identified network structure of tax competition differs markedly from the  common assumption of competition between geographically neighboring states.

 We analyze the identified social interactions matrix to provide novel  insights into the long-standing debate on the relative roles of factor  mobility and yardstick competition in driving tax setting behavior across  states. Most broadly, our results show how the analysis of social  interactions can be extended to economic realms where no network data exists.

  Date: 2018?10?08

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ifs:cemmap:58/18&r=soc

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